Miles Guo Court Documents · Doc 871

摘要

Pro Se Mandamus Petition · Compel Docketing of a § 853(n) Third-Party Petition

A 24-page filing entered on the district docket of United States v. Miles Guo, 23 Cr. 118 (AT) (S.D.N.Y.), on August 25, 2026. It reproduces a petition for a writ of mandamus lodged with the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Case 26-2382, docket entry 1.1, August 24, 2026), signed August 21, 2026. The petitioner proceeds pro se under the pseudonym "Lionheart", describing himself as an investor in the "G Enterprise" projects — including the Himalaya Exchange, G Clubs and GTV. His name and investment amount are redacted in the public copy.

The narrow relief sought

The petition is explicit that it does not ask the Court of Appeals to decide the merits of the underlying property claim. It asks only that the district court be directed to: docket the July 13, 2026 submission titled "Third-Party Petition and Motion for Alternative Restitutionary Relief Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and the Crime Victims' Rights Act"; refer it to the presiding judge for a determination of standing, timeliness and legal sufficiency; conduct the ancillary proceeding required by § 853(n) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c) if the petition is found sufficient; and preserve the status quo as to the disputed corporate equities pending that determination.

According to the petition, the submission was emailed to the S.D.N.Y. Clerk's Office / Pro Se Intake Unit on July 13, 2026 in redacted form and had remained undocketed for more than thirty days, with no judicial officer having reviewed it.

Why the writ should issue, as argued

Applying Cheney v. U.S. District Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367 (2004), the petition argues all three prerequisites are met. On a clear and indisputable right: § 853(n)(2) gives third parties a statutory right to petition, and Rule 32.2(c)(1) requires an ancillary proceeding once such a petition is filed, so at minimum the submission must reach a judicial officer for a ruling on timeliness and sufficiency. On no adequate alternative: because the clerk has not docketed the filing there is no appealable order, no pending motion and no record from which to seek review — mandamus is the only mechanism. On irreparable harm: § 853(n)(7) gives the United States clear title only after all timely petitions are disposed of, and following the district court's June 25, 2026 order authorizing administrative remission the assets could be liquidated while the filing remains unread.

A secondary argument invokes the Crime Victims' Rights Act: to the extent the petitioner qualifies as a "crime victim" under 18 U.S.C. § 3771, § 3771(d)(3) supplies an independent mandamus mechanism for the rights to notice and to be reasonably heard.

Exhibit A · the underlying third-party petition

The bulk of the filing is the § 853(n) petition itself, which objects to the forfeiture order entered against the G Enterprise entities and assets. Its arguments:

• The standard of proof. The petition states that the court's determination that the G Enterprise entities are the defendant's "alter ego" (citing Doc. 858) rested on the civil preponderance of the evidence standard, which it contends cannot justify a deprivation of third-party property rights on this scale.
• The evidence of control. As a matter of corporate law, the petition asserts, the defendant was never a shareholder, director or designated legal representative of the G Enterprise entities and received no salary or compensation from them.
• Non-party procedure. It argues that investors were given no opportunity to defend their interests before the forfeiture order issued.
• Non-prosecution agreements. It contends that prosecutorial discretion exercised through such agreements inflicted losses on investors.
• Commercial value. A section addresses what the petition calls the genuine commercial value and "scarce credit premium" of the entities.

In place of liquidation, the petition proposes an alternative restitutionary remedy: transferring the corporate equity of the G Enterprise in kind and in its entirety to the innocent investors, organized as a new "Investor Mutual Fund." It sketches the fund's capitalization, a democratic corporate-governance model with a volunteer-led ledger, and a dual-track election letting each investor choose between cashing out and retaining equity. The closing sections set out equitable and constitutional considerations, a solemn affirmation, and a compromise clause, and request recognition of the petitioner's standing as a bona fide innocent investor, access to the materials needed to litigate the ancillary proceeding, a targeted period of discovery under Rule 32.2(c)(1)(B), and vacatur or modification of the forfeiture order mandating corporate dissolution.